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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Henry Wells Lawrence Lectureship is a memorial to Professor Henry
Wells Lawrence, Chairman of the Department of History and Government at
Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. It was founded and endowed by his
former students, colleagues, and friends so as to make it possible "to bring to
the campus annually a scholar in the broad field of history who will present his
subject in the spirit of the liberal tradition to which Dr. Lawrence was devoted."
The present volume contains the seventh, eighth, and ninth lectures
delivered under this foundation. The fifth, by Professor Perry Miller of Har
vard University, discussed the contributions made by Jonathan Edwards to the
development of social criticism as an aspect of the religio-millennial thought of
the "Great Awakening." Professor Conyers Read of the University of Pennsyl
vania delivered the sixth lecture upon the subject, "Problems of Present-Day
Britain." In this he analyzes in their historic setting the continuing problems
of the nation which was the mother of liberalism in the western world, per
plexities that have some prospect of projecting themselves into the future. These
two lectures are not included in this volume.
The contributors discuss varied phases of the liberal tradition in the his
tory of the Atlantic world.
Professor Hajo Holborn of Yale University presented the seventh lecture on
October 21, 1950, when he discussed "The Reasons for the Failure of the Paris
Peace Settlement." Essentially comparative, projecting the program and prob
lems of the Paris peace-makers against the historic situation of 1919 and the
achievements of the Congress of Vienna of 1814-15, this essay analyzes prob
lems of European reconstruction and world organization with which liberals of
this century must continue to grapple. The significance of the participation of
the United States in the peace-making of 1919 is developed in the light of both
American security in the Atlantic community and European circumstances while
Woodrow Wilson's program is reappraised.
The eighth lecture was delivered by Professor Paul Wallace Gates, Chair
man of the History Department and Professor of American History of Cornell
University on November 11, 1951. His subject was, "From Individualism to
Collectivism in American Land Policy." This essay is a highly original study
of the evolution of thought and policy in a field that has been intimately related
to the origins and rise of the American democracy. The shift from individual
ism to collectivism is analyzed in the light not only of ideas but also of
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indigenous, practical problems and objectives. The importance of this trend for
traditional individualist liberalism and for the present day is stressed.
Professor Helen Maud Cam, Zemurray Professor of History at Radcliffe
College, Harvard University, delivered the ninth lecture on October 28, 1952.
Her subject was, Representative Institutions in England and Europe in the
Fifteenth Century in Relation to Later Developments." This essay presents a
broad and penetrating analysis of constitutional government as it emerged in
England during the era of the Renaissance. This is compared with developments
that doomed representative institutions on the Continent to innocuous desuetude.
At the same time, fundamental aspects of constitutionalism of continuing im
portance are developed with a view to their pertinence to the Tudor and Stuart
eras, the period of Whig dominance under the Hanoverians, and the twentieth
century.
When read together with the first and second volumes of the Series it can
be seen that the Lawrence Lectures provide a continuing forum for the analysis
and discussion of the liberal tradition in the light of historical experience. The
relevance of the essays in the present volume to important themes of current
historical research will be apparent to scholars in their several fields. Laymen
interested in the history of liberalism and its contributions to an intelligent
understanding of the mid-twentieth century will find here many a shrewd com
ment and appraisal of events, ideas, trends, and problems that are useful in
confronting the problems of the age.
CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER, Editor
Chairman, Department of History

II.

THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE PARIS
PEACE SETTLEMENT
BY HAJO HOLBORN
The historical problem of this discussion has overshadowed the lives of all
living people. The year 1919 was the high watermark of democracy in world
history. Not even 1945 can be compared to that year, since in 1945 the demo
cratic nations shared their victory with the Soviet Union and the major spoils
of victory went to the latter. In 1919 no autocratic nor authoritarian power
could obstruct the peace settlement. Still, "the war to make the world safe
for democracy," a phrase first coined by H. G. Wells in August 1914 to describe
World War I, brought forth before long the age of the dictators. "The war to
end war," as World War I was often termed, turned out to be a harbinger of
growing disaster.
It is understandable that the failure of the peace settlement of 1919 caused
a revolution of popular sentiment against collective action in international
affairs, which had a most unfortunate effect upon the course of events leading
up to World War II. On the other hand, the statesmen of World War II took
pains to avoid the repetition of what they considered to have been the blunders
of their predecessors of twenty-five years ago while at the same time trying to
realize some of their lofty ideals. The endeavor to find an objective historical
interpretation of the Paris peace settlement of 1919 is not a study of issues
belonging to a past age. In analyzing them we must reflect to a large extent
on our own political attitudes and objectives, and we may hope to gain a better
understanding of the requirements for constructive action in our own day.
The only peace settlement comparable in scope to that of 1919 was the
peace of Vienna of 1815. Nineteenth century historians heaped nothing but
condemnation on Castlereagh, Metternich, Czar Alexander, and Talleyrand for
their failure to anticipate the forces of liberalism, nationalism, and industrialism
which were to gain ascendancy in the course of the century. Woodrow Wilson
was completely under the influence of this criticism and sternly insisted that
no "odor of the Vienna settlement" should come into the discussion of Paris,
"not even by reference."
It was true that the Vienna peacemakers did not have a foreknowledge of
the future. What they sensed of the potential future strength of liberalism and
nationalism filled them with apprehension rather than sympathy. But the peace
makers of Vienna had a clear grasp of what had held the old Europe together
before the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon disrupted it. They had
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a common faith in the balance of power as the regulative principle of the
comity of European states. Long before the Congress of Vienna convened each
diplomatic and military action of the five major powers had been undertaken
with a view to the restoration of the European balance of power.
When in December 1812 Czar Alexander ordered the Russian army to
cross the western frontier of Russia in the pursuit of Napoleon's decimated
orces he made it clear to the world that Russia would not rest satisfied with
driving foreign invaders from Russian soil but would continue the war to the
destruction of any continental empire greater than her own. When Austria
joined the alliance in the late summer of 1812 she was already afraid that a
collapse of Napoleon's empire might open the way to Russia's predominance
on t e continent. All through the war Austria used the greatest circumspection
an every device of diplomatic maneuver to preserve the historic France, since
Metternich believed that France was needed in the councils of the great Euro
pean powers. The entire military and diplomatic strategy of the Allied cam
paigns was carefully molded in accordance with the ultimate political aims of
Austria, Britain, and Russia to restore a European equilibrium. Before the
cone usion of hostilities the Allies had entered among themselves into political
agreements which clearly adumbrated the restoration of the European balance
system. Grave conflicts divided the Congress of Vienna, but the preparation
of a peace settlement through well-directed wartime policies and the unity on
asic principles among the statesmen carried the Congress to its success.
he achievements of the Vienna Congress were impressive. For a century
no general European war comparable to the thirty-odd years of belligerency
and upheaval after 1792 recurred. Moreover, for forty years after 1815 no war
T s L ° U f ! o e e n a n y o f t h e S r e a t Eufopean powers. Thereafter between
854 and 1870 wars between two or more major European states took place in
1870
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pean war, but not wars as such. And as the century drew on wars grew ever
more disruptive. With the industrialization of certain continental states like
Germany and with the vast increase in the destructive power of modern armies
the European balance of power lost much of its effectiveness. But the statesmen
of Vienna themselves had already known that the balance of power by itself
could not guarantee peace in all circumstances. They had attempted to build
a concert of Europe which was to guard the political and social order of the
world. Yet the sound concept of a united European action was frustrated by the
social bias of the statesmen of the Holy Alliance. They understood social order
in strictly conservative or reactionary terms as the preservation of absolute
monarchy and the privileges of nobility. It was impossible to suppress the
modern capitalistic development and the concomitant liberal and national move
ments. The concert of Europe broke down after seven years, largely because
Britain, far advanced in her own political and social development, was un
willing to tolerate intervention in the affairs of others by a group of reactionary
states.
If we compare the Paris to the Vienna settlement it is obvious that some
of the fundamental elements which made for unity and mutual understanding
among the peacemakers of Vienna were lacking in 1919. The wars of 18121815 had a common aim, namely the defeat of Napoleon's attempt at uniting
the European continent under his dictatorial power and the restoration of the
old European state system. The war of 1914-1918 did not have such a single
common denominator. Of course, the immediate war aim, the destruction of
Germany's overweening power, was generally shared by all the Allies, but there
was no clarity about the type of Europe the Allies wanted to re-erect. There
were ideas to replace the old balance of power system by the rule of law sup
ported by a League of Nations, and the realization of national self-determination
was usually considered the most important preparatory step in this direction.
But the actual policies were not in line with these high aspirations. The exigen
cies of war drove the European statesmen to rely even more extensively upon
the balance of power. Two distinctions have to be drawn at this point, the
first concerning the general character of World War I and the other with regard
to the balance of power in Europe.
In a strict sense the war that started in August, 1914, was not a world
war but a European war. The British originally called it the "Great War."
Although the frictions among European nations had been greatly aggravated
by the competition for colonial possessions and profits in the forty years prior
to 1914, the war was caused by European issues. It was true that Britain en
joyed from the outset the support of her world-wide empire and that Japan
very soon began the conquest of the German colonies in the Far East. Still, the
war of 1914 was, and remained till 1917, basically a European war, and every
body expected that its great decisions would be the result of the military efforts
of the major European powers.
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Each of the two camps of states, the Triple Entente and the Central Pow
ers, believed itself to be capable not only of balancing but also of outbalancing
each other on the battlefields. France, Britain, and Russia felt confident that
they could overwhelm Germany and Austria-Hungary if not in the early begin
ning certainly at a time when the British blockade became fully effective and
Russia could throw her millions into the fray. Germany on her part planned
to use the time gained by the slow mobilization of Russia to administer a
knock-out blow to France and then turn around toward the East to stem the
Russian tide. But the calculations of the European statesmen and generals of
all these nations proved wrong. The Germans did not conquer France. The
battle of the Marne brought the German advance to a standstill without giving
the Allies the strategic initiative. In spite of the unprecedented slaughter of
millions, a strategic stalemate ensued for practically four years at the western
front.
Events at the eastern front made it impossible for Britain and France to
derive full advantage from the alliance with Russia and vice versa. Russia had
millions of soldiers but not the industries to arm them nor the transportation
to move vast armies and their supplies. If Churchill's scheme to seize the
Turkish Straits in 1915 had been successful, the East-West alliance might have
become powerful enough to crush Germany. But Germany sitting athwart the
communication lines between Russia and her western allies could choose where
to take the offensive. Russia in her isolation succumbed to the German on
slaught. The whole politcal and social organization of the old Russia broke
into smithereens. In the spring of 1918 Germany could marshal superior
forces which would have defeated the British and French armies if American
troops had not been available for their relief and support.
After the great disappointment of the fighting in the early months of the
war the Allies had gone around shopping for additional allies who would help
them to tip the balance against Germany. Dire military necessity seemed to
make the concessions inevitable which the Allies made in order to bring Italy
and Rumania into the war. The secret treaties sacrificed liberal principles on
the altar of Mars and nationalistic power politics. It is frightening to visualize
what Europe would have looked like if the European allies, including Russia,
had been victorious over the central powers without the intervention of the
United States. No doubt this would have been still much preferable to the
dictates which Ludendorff would have imposed in case of a German victory.
His Russian treaties of Brest-Litovsk and the Rumanian treaty of Bucharest
were clear examples of his ultimate aims. But if the European Allies had made
the peace, a Europe would have come into being on very shaky grounds as a
result of the secret treaties.
The secret treaties did not restore the European balance of power. As a
matter of fact, the European war of 1914-1917 proved that the European politi
cal system that originated in 1494 and grew to maturity in the 18th century
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was drawing to its death. The great European war was finally decided by the
intervention of the United States, and with the entrance of the United States
in the war it definitely became a world war.
The war of 1914 threatened to destroy the Atlantic order on which Ameri
can security had rested during the 19th century. If the Allies had been defeated
the United States would have had to face on the eastern shores of the Atlantic
a practically united continent which could even draw on the resources of Eur
asia. And this huge accumulation of power would have been in the hands of a
state which in the quarrels over the international law of the sea gave America
a foretaste of its dictatorial manners. The United States had good reasons for
associating herself with the Allies at a time when, owing to the impending
Russian collapse, their fortunes were falling. The American people, unhappily,
often lost sight of these cogent reasons and viewed the American participation
in the war entirely in the light of a crusade for freedom and democracy. This
popular emotion should not be unduly condemned or ridiculed. It was historic
ally understandable that Americans, once they were challenged to build a better
international order, would rely on those principles which for the first time in
world history had made democracy a success on a continent-wide basis.
No other political document could have offered as much guidance for the
establishment of a peaceful international society as did the American constitu
tion and Woodrow Wilson ably and eloquently projected the American politi
cal tradition into a liberal international faith. The weakness of Wilson's inter
national program lay in the generality of many of its tenets and also in con
flicts among them. The principle of national self-determination, for example,
was not everywhere applicable; in certain cases it conflicted with other Wilsonian principles like that of access to the sea for landlocked states. But the lac
of absolute logical unity and adaptability to concrete issues could have been
improved once the program was actually translated into action at the peace
conference.
.,
More serious was Wilson's stubborn belief that his abstract ideals could
blot out certain realities of political power. He was profoundly convinced that
his international program, as embodied in the Fourteen Points and additional
speeches expressed the longings of the common man all over the globe. This
assumption was not altogether fallacious. The appeal of the Wilsonian ideas
durin» World War I was great, and they contributed in a decisive manner tc
the breakdown of enemy resistance. Moreover, in spite of the disappointments
of the Paris settlement they became a powerful ferment of political thought
and action. In some respects one could wish that American policy in World
War II had hewn closer to the Wilsonian line, though it is undoubtedly true
that the greater tactical skill of Roosevelt made possible the final realization of
some of the Wilsonian ideals like the United Nations.
The main criticism that can be levied against Wilson, the statesman, should
not be directed against his program as such, but rather against his misunder-
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standing of the relationship between ideas and power in history. Wilson
thought that the proclamation of the new international ideals would rally the
common men everywhere to their support. In this sense he could say that only
he and not Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and others represented the people. The
major test of Wilson's assumption came when he appealed over the head of
the Italian government to the Italian people for a modification of Italy's de
mands for expansion and aroused a violent nationalistic reaction. The sovereign
nation state was in full bloom and not likely to wither away under the impact
of Wilson's ideals. In democratic terms Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and
Orlando represented their peoples better than Wilson did. They had parlia
mentary majorities behind them, while Wilson had lost control of Congress in
the November elections, and it was doubtful what future American opposition
his treaty might have to face. In retrospect it could be argued that Wilson
wou
have done better to rest his case before the American Senate and elec
torate not exclusively on idealistic grounds but also on the American interest
in the preservation of the balance of power which the Allied victory had
create . His one-sided emphasis on world improvement gave many Americans
the impression that Wilson had attended in Paris not to American needs but to
esoteric objectives.
If the League was to come into being its roots had to be planted deeply
e soi of national security interests. Such policy required the frank rec
ognition of the balance of power which Wilson rejected. In practice he could
no help to make all sorts of concessions to the balance of power, but they
ere usua y wrapped up in the language of some general principle. It would
e een etter to call a spade a spade instead of getting lost in what hostile
tics could label double-talk. Naturally, after all her losses France would not
I n n r T T SCtt e m e n t t b a t w o u J d allow Germany t o renew the war before
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damage through confusion. With regard to the Paris treaties their weak and
contradictory moral basis made people in later years unwilling to enforce them.
Winston Churchill and Lloyd George have stated their opinions on the
peace settlement of Paris. Both do not think that the peace makers of Paris
should be blamed for the ultimate failure of the peace settlement. Both think
that the statesmen of the inter-war period were responsible for the deterioration
of international affairs which ushered in World War II. Lloyd George criticizes
chiefly the lack of magnanimity in the revision of the peace treaties, and it
should be mentioned that Lloyd George had been in favor of revising the draft
treaty of Versailles in May and June of 1919.
Churchill seems to agree with Lloyd George on these points, but he accuses
the statesman of the inter-war period of negligence, because they squandered
the powers which the peace settlement had deposited in them. No doubt the
military superiority of Britain and France was safely established by the peace
settlement. It has often been asserted, particularly during World War II, that
the disarmament provisions of Versailles were faulty and permitted the Germans
to rearm secretly. The Germans violated, indeed, the disarmament articles of
the Versailles Treaty even before 1933- But modern war mobilization requires
the total use of manpower and all industries. These measures were taken only
by Hitler, and though they were taken quite openly Britain and France failed
to intervene. Churchill is quite right in condemning British and French leaders
for conceding freedom of armaments to Germany before her grievances had
been allayed. He goes as far as to call the second World War "the unneces
sary war."
Churchill's judgment on the statesmen of the inter-war period is correct
and nobody is better qualified to pronounce it than the man who was one of
the very few people aware of the approaching catastrophe when not only Britain
but also the world slept. But it does not offer an explanation of the historical
forces which made possible the policies conducted by these statesmen with the
assent of their nations. In my opinion, one of the main reasons must be found
in the disregard of the realities of power which the peace conference of Paris
initiated and in the indiscriminate use of high principles. When the League
failed to gain strength and ultimately broke down as an instrument of interna
tional policy, there was not even as much balance of power left as had existed
in 1914.
Wilson had proclaimed as early as January, 1917, that after the war there
should be no "new balance of power" but a "community of power," yet the
peace conference achieved neither. A community of power without balance of
power would require universality and a spirit of cooperation founded on com
mon ideals. But Russia was left outside the pale. I do not wish to suggest that
a solution of the Russian problem would have been simple or even possible in
1919. The French were stubbornly opposed to any diplomatic dealings with the
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Bolshevists. They advocated intervention without, however, being able to indi
cate the military means with which to stage a successful intervention. Winston
Churchill, then British secretary of war, actively worked for intervention, but
in the review of his actions in his memoirs of World War I he doubted himself
whether the White-Russian elements deserved Allied support.
Lloyd George was a non-interventionist as was Woodrow Wilson. Lloyd
George considered that Allied intervention in Russia would be as self-defeating
as foreign intervention in the French Revolution had been more than a century
ago. He wanted to make diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. But in the end
nothing decisive was done in any direction.
When Lloyd George resumed his appeal for peaceful relations with the
Soviet Union at the Conference of Genoa in 1922 it was already too late.
Russia and Germany, the two chief opponents of the Paris settlements, came
together and concluded the treaty of Rapallo. When Germany joined the
League of Nations in 1926 she was exempted from League obligations in case
the new League decided on sanctions against Russia and in a new treaty the
Russo-German cooperation begun at Rapallo was further extended.
From a historical point of view it is impossible to say what should have
een done about the problem of Russia in 1919. But obviously the funda
mental significance of the issue was gravely underrated, and none of the serious
consequences of defaulting on it were foreseen. Probably it was inevitable in
all circumstances that Moscow would set herself up as the world center oppos
ing the rule of liberal-democratic principles, but these pretenses had to be
ought by other than mere political weapons which we shall discuss a bit later.
Russo-German collaboration after 1919 proceeded, however, less on the basis
of ideological unity than of power politics. The chief supporters of the Russian
orientation in Germany were the parties of the right and of the army, the
sweir
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Bolshevists. They advocated intervention without, however, being able to indi
cate the military means with which to stage a successful intervention. Winston
Churchill, then British secretary of war, actively worked for intervention, but
in the review of his actions in his memoirs of World War I he doubted himself
whether the White-Russian elements deserved Allied support.
Lloyd George was a non-interventionist as was Woodrow Wilson. Lloyd
George considered that Allied intervention in Russia would be as self-defeating
as foreign intervention in the French Revolution had been more than a century
ago. He wanted to make diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. But in the end
nothing decisive was done in any direction.
When Lloyd George resumed his appeal for peaceful relations with the
Soviet Union at the Conference of Genoa in 1922 it was already too late.
Russia and Germany, the two chief opponents of the Paris settlements, came
together and concluded the treaty of Rapallo. When Germany joined the
League of Nations in 1926 she was exempted from League obligations in case
the new League decided on sanctions against Russia and in a new treaty the
Russo-German cooperation begun at Rapallo was further extended.
From a historical point of view it is impossible to say what should have
been done about the problem of Russia in 1919. But obviously the funda
mental significance of the issue was gravely underrated, and none of the serious
consequences of defaulting on it were foreseen. Probably it was inevitable in
all circumstances that Moscow would set herself up as the world center oppos
ing the rule of liberal-democratic principles, but these pretenses had to be
fought by other than mere political weapons which we shall discuss a bit later.
Russo-German collaboration after 1919 proceeded, however, less on the basis
of ideological unity than of power politics. The chief supporters of the Russian
orientation in Germany were the parties of the right and of the army, the
Reichswehr. It goes without saying that the Communist party was, of course
supporting Russo-German collaboration and even more than that, the complete
subordination of German policy under Moscow, but the German Communist
party never exercised an influence on the official conduct of German foreign
policy.
But the political collaboration between Germany and the Soviet Union
placed at once the states along the eastern fringe of Europe, Finland, the Baltic
states, and Poland, in a precarious position. That they had gained independence
from Russia in 1918 was due to the feats of the German arms in World War I
in a ition to the subsequent collapse of Germany and Austria-Hungary
as we as the alienation between the western powers and Russia, which was
altogether one of the most amazing changes of the historical scene that ever
appened in history. The French contributed at least to the preservation of the
independence of the north-eastern European states by the mission of General
Weygand to Warsaw at the time of the Russo-Polish war of 1920-21. His
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advice helped to stall the Russian onslaught. But not even the greatest strategic
genius could have changed the great military disequilibrium that developed in
eastern Europe after 1921. Whatever might happen in the end on a world-wide
plane, these small states were bound to suffer once the eastern great powers
recovered.
This applied also to the south-eastern European states, usually called the
succession states to the Habsburg empire, though Rumania and Yugoslavia
and also Poland derived only a part of their possessions from the Habsburgs.
To conceive of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland as a replace
ment of France's pre-World War I ally Russia, was rather injudicious. At best
the worth of these states could have been measured by the services which the
Habsburg empire had given to Germany during World War I, and they had
not been too strong. The distribution of national sovereignty among a larger
group of national states in this area was not likely to improve their military
strength. As a matter of fact, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and pos
sibly Poland these states were between 1919 and 1939 a liability to the western
powers rather than an addition of strength. It should be remembered that the
French had poured billions into Russia before 1914 to turn her into an effective
military ally. They were unable to repeat this, since the loss of their loans to
Russia had made the French rentier fearful of foreign investments. But without
them these states, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, could never be strong
military allies nor could they become democratic. Practically all of them soon
turned into semi-authoritarian states.
This leads us to another fundamental misreading of the new trends by
the peacemakers of Paris. They were unprepared to face the impact of modern
war on society. Broadly speaking, the wars of earlier times had been wars of
armies—armies of restricted, if expanding, numbers limited in their techno
logical equipment. But World War I had assumed a new and revolutionary
character. Formerly the production of arms ceased when war broke out, but
after 1916 industrial mobilization became as gigantic as the military levies. In
other words, after 1916 World War I turned into the first modern total war
changing, and in many instances revolutionizing, social habits and attitudes.
The impact of this event was greatest in Russia, which tried but did not succeed
in a total mobilization, and in Germany, which did succeed in achieving a rather
complete government-directed war economy, the first planned economy, as a
result of the Allied blockade and the demands of the front line.
Nobody in Paris recognized that total war could only be cured by total
diplomacy. Frontier regulations would not suffice to guarantee peace. Apart
from political issues diplomacy would have to deal with economic, social, and
ideological ones. The appearance of total war shocked many people, but most
of them comforted themselves with the hope that there would be a restoration
of the "normal" structure of societies and "normal" attitudes of their members.
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This was probably the major reason that the statesmen of the period thought
that a diplomatic peace would settle a war which actually had become a sort
of world revolution.
The peace treaties contained arrangements for political frontiers and some
rather sketchy provisions for the military defense of the new order, but little
beyond that. After the drafting and signing of the peace treaties public opinion
in all Allied countries relapsed and demanded to go back to normalcy. This
could mean, as it did in the case of the United States, almost complete with
drawal from world politics. But as a sentiment it influenced even the European
nations which remained active in the diplomatic field.
The desire to have
only a minimum of international organization in political, economic, and social
affairs was noticeable everywhere. But peacemaking after a protracted total war
could no longer be conducted in the forms of the traditional diplomatic confer
ences. It called for an extension of diplomatic activity into new fields.
Wilson was not unaware of the deep changes in the character of interna
tional relations. He knew that the individual, from whom in modern politics
the sanctioning force for any order must come, would not place his full faith
in a collective system if it did not prove its worth in the economic and social
fields as well. The peace conference tackled a number of social problems, but
most of them were of a general humanitarian character and not of crucial
significance in the social and economic life of the world.
What would have been needed most was the restoration of a liberal world
economy, but in this respect the peace conference failed completely. In the
third of the Fourteen Points Wilson had demanded economic freedom, but this
point had run into strong domestic opposition, and Wilson resigned himself to
the situation. He was also not in a position to discuss at Paris a settlement of
inter-Allied war debts, which aggravated the problem of German reparations.
It is clear that the expectation of future German reparation payments which the
French and British entertained at Paris in 1919 were fantastic, as John Maynard
Keynes, who resigned from the British delegation, rightly predicted. But
no ody would have set any exact figure of reparations or other big-scale inter
national payments like the inter-Allied debts unless he knew something about
t e uture of international trade. If the peacemakers had taken steps toward
the expansion of international commerce, greater sums might have been trans
ferred than actually were between 1919 and 1932.
But nothing was undertaken to reestablish systematically the foundations
ree world economy of the nineteenth century, and even less was done
to expand world production and world trade. With the demand for extrava
gant reparations and an unrealistic inter-Allied debt settlement the balance of
international payments was entirely upset. From 1924 to 1931 American private
oans enai e
ermany to pay reparations, which then were used by the receiver
part y or, as in the case of Britain, altogether for the payment of Ameri-
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can war debts. Winston Churchill has rightly called this system "insane.
But the situation from 1919 to 1924 was worse and helped to breed all the
anti-democratic forces of the right and left which after the great economic
crisis of the early thirties were to undo the work of the peacemakers of 1919I am not contending that modern totalitarianism is only the outgrowth of
economic tribulations. It appeared in the inter-war period only in countries
with a strong tradition of autocracy. The anti-democratic forces were powerful
in Germany, and it was to be expected that they would make a bid for return
to internal and external power. The unsettled state of eastern and southeastern
Europe gave them hope that the tables could be turned against the World War I
allies, whose political cooperation after 1920 became strained or non-existent.
There were also some sound German grievances, though fewer than were played
up by German nationalistic propaganda, which enabled the German nation
alists to keep German resentment against the peace settlement alive.
But there existed in Germany in the twenties also a strong feeling against
war and a majority opinion that a revision of the Versailles Treaty should be
sought only by peaceful means. If earlier concessions had been made to these
movements, and if on the other hand the stability of eastern and southeastern
Europe had been strengthened, history might have taken a different course. But
the international economic policies of the inter-war period finally turned central
and eastern Europe into the anti-liberal camp.
At the beginning of our discussion we compared the peace conferences
of Vienna and Paris. The truth is that they cannot be compared. Vienna was
the settlement of twenty-odd years of war in which the revolutionary forces had
been able to modify but not overthrow the old order. In contrast the Paris
Peace Conference was a first attempt to deal with the radically new situation
which had manifested itself only in the course of World War I. Most people
refused to recognize that World War I had brought about revolutionary changes
in world politics and thought of the War as an unhappy event which would
not exclude the return to normalcy or, to put it differently, to the pre-War
conditions. Actually World War I created not only one world but also the
absolute necessity for dealing with political issues in terms of total diplomacy.
The second World War has driven home these points again apart from
creating new problems. Still, after thirty-five years of international turmoil we
have not reached a safe haven. No prediction can be made when we shall do
so. But one thing we can say with confidence: All the sacrifices our soldiers
make to establish a rule of law in this world will be in vain if we do not
succeed in understanding the historic forces of our age, which will be judged
by future generations according to our own achievements and failures.

III.

FROM INDIVIDUALISM TO COLLECTIVISM IN
AMERICAN LAND POLICY
BY PAUL WALLACE GATES
In the course of the nineteenth century liberalism in America went through
profound changes, its early attitudes and meanings being taken over by ele
ments thoroughly conservative in character and its early supporters moving to
policies that were quite the reverse of their previous position. In the early
years of the century liberalism connoted equality of man, freedom of conscience,
of speech, personal liberty, individualism. It also meant laissez faire policies
on the part of the state, the removal of existing restrictions, class privileges,
controls, prohibitions and monopolies.
Following the Civil War these concepts, which we associate with the
Je ersonian tradition, were assimilated by the rapidly emerging business inter
ests an made to serve their purposes as protection against the new liberalism
was demanding the policing of the corporations, trust busting, even gov
ernment ownership. By the twentieth century Jefferson and the earlier con-
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the object of this paper to trace the changes in the concept of liberalism in land
policy and to show that they were the result, not of radical or socialistic theories
imported as it were into the field of land policies, although these theories
helped to bring about changes, but that fundamentally the new policies were
the result of the hard practical experience of the American people.
The objectives of colonial land policies were twofold: those pursued by
the mother country and those pursued by influential individuals. Imperial
policies as they were finally perfected were intended to permit a slow controlled
advance westward and to treat the land as a permanent source of revenue under
the quit rent system for the support of the colonial governments. These policies
were wiped out by the Revolution. Meantime, prominent and influential indi
viduals in the colonial period had attempted to establish for themselves great
baronies over which they might rule, but the abundance of land, the individual
ism and spirit of independence of the common people, and the comparative
ease of squatting upon land without title made their path difficult. Confisca
tion, abolition of primogeniture and entail and of other relics of medieval
tenure, the emergence of a more democratic electorate, the low price and free
grant policies of the states after the Revolution shattered their hopes. Never
theless, the well born, the wealthy, the aggressive and ambitious did not give
up trying to establish large estates.
The new national land system, created to administer the public domain
ceded by the states and later acquired from other countries, was framed in an
era when liberal principles were not held in high repute. The old imperial
policy of using the public land as a source of revenue became the basic prin
ciple of the new land system, and the settlement of the west and the welfare
of the settlers were subordinated to it. So long as the revenue concept domi
nated our national land policies the various regulations adopted to develop
that revenue as easily and as quickly as possible gave purchasers of large tracts
advantages over the small buyer that for years enabled capitalist groups to act
as middlemen in selling land and exacting profits from settlers. To begin with,
half the land was to be sold in blocks of 5,120 acres and the other half in the
alternate townships was to be divided into 640 acre sections and sold, the
minimum price being $2 an acre. Credit was eventually extended but it only
helped the capitalist to acquire more land. No restrictions of any kind were
placed on the amount of land individuals or groups could buy from the gov
ernment. Since the units of sale were much too large for him the pioneer
settler was virtually denied an opportunity to acquire public lands and was
obliged to go to the middleman who could purchase large tracts and retail them
out in small pieces.
In the second, fourth, and sixth decades of the nineteenth century occurred
periods of great inflation produced by extravagant public spending on internal
improvements with borrowed funds, unsound banking practices, including large
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emissions of wildcat and shinplaster currency, unusually high commodity prices
—cotton in 1818 and wheat in the fifties—war
conditions abroad and prolif
eration of railroad companies at home. Since almost unlimited credit was
available for anyone of influence and property, land values were rising rapidly
and there developed a scramble for public lands that reached its greatest excite
ment in Alabama in 1818, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Mississippi in 18351836, and Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa and Missouri in the fifties. By a conserva
tive estimate it appears that 5,000,000 acres in the second decade, 25,000 000
in the thirties and 40,000,000 in the fifties were bought by land companies
and individual capitalists that thus came to control whole townships and large
parts of counties.2
Some of this speculative ownership was not firm or stable. During the
periods of depression that soon followed each era of inflation many land holders
were frozen out by increasing tax and interest costs which they were unable to
bear, but others, who had not so overextended, managed to carry their invest
ment for many years in the hope of receiving their anticipated profits. There
was thus established in all the better parts of the middle west and Gulf states
absentee ownership which contributed nothing to develop either the lands or
the communities in which they were located. The owners only waited for the
increase in value which settlers on neighboring tracts would create by the labor
ey performed in making improvements and constructing roads, churches, and
Wlt
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Not all this land that was bought by easterners in large quantities was
acquired for mere speculation. A considerable number of easterners like Henry
L. Ellsworth of Connecticut, Daniel Webster, James Wadsworth of the Gen
esee Valley of New York, planned to establish large estates operated by tenants
in the midst of whom they would live as country gentry. Ellsworth and others
like him moved to their holdings and devoted their energies to improving,
developing and settling them, not always with success, however.4
Far the larger part of the 70,000,000 acres acquired in extensive holdings
was bought for the expected rise in land values by speculators who had no
intention of investing anything more than the cost of the land and management.
The intrusion of these speculators between the government and the actual set
tlers in the primary disposition of its lands won increasing disapproval, both
in the west and in the east. Westerners without capital but anxious to own
land contemplated with bitterness the extensive tracts owned by absentees who
contributed nothing to their development, but insisted on withholding them
from sale and use until they would bring a profitable return. In their dislike
of absentee owners the westerners took pleasure in stealing their timber, pastur
ing livestock on their grass, and assessing their land at high valuations. Since
the distribution of the public lands in their midst was a government matter,
they turned to politics for relief from the unwanted speculator. They petitioned
Congress, the president, the General Land Office, to grant them the right of
preemption which would enable them to get in ahead of the speculator, then
to postpone the land sales which would put off the day when they had either
to pay for their claims or see them purchased by speculators at the auction, to
reduce the price of land, and finally and most important, to grant land without
cost to actual settlers. They formed claim or squatter associations to intimidate
by mass threat possible buyers of their improved claims. Western representa
tives and senators took up their pleas and pressed them with increasing vigor
in Congress.
It was not only at the speculator with his large holdings that western
resentment was directed but increasingly the government was being charged
with profiting from the labor of the pioneer in augmenting or creating land
values. Long before Henry George shook the foundations of the citadel erected
by the industrial barons on the twin doctrines of laissez faire and Social Dar
winism by calling for the single tax the west had reached the pragmatic view
that unimproved land on the frontier had no value. Only through the coming
of the settlers who cleared, fenced and broke the land, erected their homes and
laid out roads and established schools, churches and local government was
4

For Ellsworth, one of the largest buyers of western land but who ultimately failed in
his goal to establish a great and long lasting estate, see Paul Wallace Gates, "Land
Policy and Tenancy in the Prairie Counties of Indiana, Indiana Magazine of History,
XXXV (March, 1939), 6 S. The most successful and largest farming estate in
America that was acquired from the United States and developed through tenants, that
of William Scully, is described in the same author's Frontier Landlords and Pioneer
Tenants (Ithaca, 1945), pp. 34-63.
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value given to land. The government, thought the west, like speculators,
gained the unearned increment by charging a high price which came out of the
sweat and toil of the pioneers.5 For his boldness in striking into new and
previously untouched territory, his willingness to undergo great hardships and
to deprive his family of the amenities of a well established society, he should
be rewarded, not penalized, by being permitted to enjoy the full benefits of his
action in developing new communities. He should be given the land, not sold
it at high prices.
In the east the organizers of the struggling labor parties took up the cry
of land reform in the hope of providing an outlet for the unemployed and a
program economically attractive to them. The intellectual leader who framed
the reform demands and worked out their philosophical justification was George
Henry Evans, borrowing from Thomas Skidmore. As editor of radical weeklies,
as lecturer, pamphleteer and leader in trade union activities, Evans drew atten
tion to the land question as a major issue of the day. He maintained that the
use and ownership of land was a natural right as land provided the basis of
living. To guarantee that right, the public domain should be distributed freely
in small tracts to its users. The right of alienation should not accompany the
right of use, argued Evans, for only by preventing the sale on mortgage of
homesteads and denying the right of inheritance could land be prevented from
accumulating in the hands of a few.6
Here then is a combination of western pragmatic reasoning and eastern
philosophical support for land reform. Horace Greeley, never one to spurn
radical ideas, took over the reform program of Evans and documented it lav15 Y
y accounts in the New York Tribune of his experiences and observations
gathered on his trips through the west. Contemporaries were shown the harsh
ness of frontier life among settlers who were desperately seeking to make farms
or themselves on lands for which they had had to pay outrageously high prices
t ey a bought from speculators or for which, whether acquired from
previous owners or from the government they had used funds borrowed at usury
rates that ran as high as 120 and 150% a year.?
ref°rrners cry for a liberal land policy that would prevent land monpo y an permit the pioneer, the farm maker on the frontier to acquire
ownership of his land without having to pay for the increased value his and
neighborhood improvements gave to it gained support in high places. In Con-
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gress Thomas Hart Benton, Andrew Johnson, George W. Julian and others
took up the issue, arguing for general preemption, reduction in price, free
lands, and restrictions on speculative purchasing. Andrew Jackson was the first
and in effect the only president who advocated drastic reform of government
land policy so that the public domain would be reserved for actual settlers. In
his annual message on the state of the Union in December, 1832, he stated his
belief that it was the labor of the "adventurous and hardy population of the
West" which "gives real value to the land." He urged abandonment of the
sales policy with its high minimum price and the substitution of a policy of
charging actual settlers a fee just sufficient to cover the cost of survey and
management.8 No legislation followed his recommendation and in 1836 Jack
son returned to the fray, this time with positive action.
The country, particularly the west, was caught up in a frenzy of land
speculation in which government sales had skyrocketed from an average of
2,000,000 to 4,000,000 acres a year to 20,000,000 in 1836. In 1835 and 1836
alone probably 22,000,000 to 25,000,000 acres were purchased for speculation.9
Himself a speculator in public lands in the past Andrew Jackson knew full well
the dangers from such large scale monopolization by a few hundred or thousand
speculators. In June, 1836, he issued his famous Specie Circular that by requir
ing the payment of gold or silver instead of bank notes for public lands effec
tively halted the wild orgy of land speculation.10 The Circular, Jackson said
later, had "measurably cut off the means of speculation and retarded its prog
ress in monopolizing the most valuable of the public lands. It had tended to
save the new states from a nonresident proprietorship, one of the greatest ob
stacles to the advancement of a new country and the prosperity of an old one.
It has tended to keep open the public lands for entry by emigrants at Govern
ment prices instead of their being compelled to purchase of speculators at
double or triple prices.11
8

James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II (!904), 601.
My estimate is based on analysis of the sales for early years together with those of
1835 and 1836. Although I have worked through all the land entry books for this
period I have not made a detailed investigation to determine the actual amount of land
bought by non-settlers. Thomas Ewing, Senator from Ohio, estimated that about
20,000,000 acres were purchased by speculators in 1835 and 1836. Apparently he
thought of speculative purchasing as including only those large tracts bought by men
of wealth or by land companies. For Ewing's estimates see Congressional Globe, 24
Cong., 2 Sess,, Appendix, p. 289.

9
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For the Circular which was actually issued by Levi Woodbury, Secretary of the Treas
ury, see American State Papers, Public Lands, VIII, 910.

11

Annual Message to Congress, December 5, 1836, in Richardson, III, 249-50. The
House of Representatives had previously provided for an investigation of the amount
of borrowing by members of Congress and other government officials from deposit
banks for speculation in public lands. A comprehensive investigation might have been
salutary for there is plenty of evidence of prominent members of Congress buying pub
lic lands in large quantities but the efforts of the House Committee to secure evidence
were fruitless. Congressional Globe, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 609-10, July 2, 1836;
House Reports, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 846, pp. 1-6.
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Jackson s vigorous championship of land reform was followed by a strong
effort in Congress to halt speculative purchasing and "limit sales to settlers or
cultivators or, as Robert J. Walker, Senator from Mississippi put it, "to arrest
monopolies of the public lands." With prophetic insight Walker predicted that
the accumulation of land by capitalists for speculation would "introduce into
the new states, the system of landlord and tenant, by which the occupant will
not be the owner of the soil he cultivates, but the tributary of some absentee
landlord, who will, in the shape of an annual rent, reap nearly all the profits of
the labor of the cultivator. A measure to limit sales to actual settlers was
fiercely opposed by eastern conservatives who continued to look upon the public
lands as a national treasure which should provide income for the government
and thereby reduce the need for taxes. Nothing should be permitted to inter
fere with the free flow of sales and of resultant income. To these opponents
of land reform the Walker-Jackson plan was radical, levelling, and democratic.
It would make ownership for the poor and landless too easy, would drain off
the laborers from the older areas and reduce land values there, and would
accelerate the growth of the west unduly and thereby upset the political balance
of power. Against the reform measure was employed every possible praliamentary maneuver and delaying tactic but almost solid western support carried it
through the Senate. In the House, where western influence was weaker, it was
defeated.12 Not for years was another effort to be made to bar speculators from
purchasing public lands.
The land reformers welcomed the Specie Circular as a blow to the devel
opment of land monopoly but felt let down by Congress which failed to act
upon Jackson's request for protection against speculative purchases. Was not
the government the greatest land monopolist and land speculator and a profiteer
from the labor of frontiersmen whose painful advances westward gave value to
the public lands? Did not a truly liberal land policy call for the abandonment
o the revenue concept and the adoption of a free homestead plan and the rapid
transfer of the public domain to private hands ? Step by step the country inched
nearer these goals, although the revenue concept, while it ceased to be predomi
nant, was never to be completely abandoned. In 1841 the Preemption Law
gave settlers the right to move upon and improve surveyed public land from
which they might with good luck make the necessary funds to purchase it
wit out competitive bidding for $1.25 an acre. Only 160 acres could be acquired
in this way. In 1847-55 Congress gave enlisted men in the Mexican War and
veterans of all previous wars who had not been rewarded with land bounties
warrants entitling them to 160 acres of the public lands. These warrants were
vi ually land office money but they were issued in such quantities—altogether
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they covered more than 61,000,000 acres—that they sold at prices ranging
from 50 cents to $1.10 per acre. Most entries were made with the warrants
since they were available everywhere at quoted rates and the effect of their issue
was to reduce the cost of public land. In 1854 the Graduation Act reduced the
price of land not newly brought into market from $1.25 an acre in proportion
to the length of time it had been subject to sale, the lower limit being 12y2c.
Only 320 acres could be acquired legally by any individual under this measure.
Finally, in 1862, after a bitter struggle with the south, free homesteads of
160 acres were offered to anyone who would settle upon and improve govern
ment land.
Greeley's agitation and western yearning for free grants had convinced
the Republicans that the issue could win many votes and it did. During the
next decades their stand upon the homestead issue paid the party political
dividends. What were then frontier states like Wisconsin, Minnesota, Kansas,
Iowa, and later Nebraska were so angered by Democratic President Buchanan's
veto of a homestead bill and by the insistence of his administration on forcing
lands on the market in the depression days of 1858-1860 as a means of raising
revenue to balance the budget, thereby forcing thousands of impoverished set
tlers to purchase their claims with money borrowed of loan sharks, that they
turned to the Republican Party with majorities that surpassed the support it
had anywhere else.13
The philosophy behind the Homestead Act of 1862 was not the natural
rights argument of Evans and the land reformers. Few could regard Wade or
Chandler or Pomeroy or Morrill as radicals. Yet they pushed to adoption a
measure that was comparable to the capitalization and distribution of the
national forests, parks, dams, generating plants, mineral reserves and gold in
Fort Knox of today. The free grant policy was based on the assumption that
the cost of farm making, of pioneering on the prairies and plains was so great
that few people could succeed in the process if they had to buy the land from
the government. The Republicans seem to have come to the view that land
itself had no value; that what value it had when made into farms was to be
attributed to the labors of the farm maker. To this extent, at least, the land
reformers' views prevailed. But the Republicans threw aside all other aspects
of Evans' and Greeley's reforms. There were no restrictions on the alienation
of homesteads after the title had passed, no limitations on the amount of land
that could be acquired from the government, no repeal of the cash sale law
with the right of unrestricted purchase of public lands, no withdrawal of lands
from unlimited purchase, no steps taken to confiscate large holdings except the
punitive measures directed against the Rebels, no safeguards to prevent accumu
lation of new estates.
13

Paul W. Gates, "The Struggle for Land and the 'Irrepressible Conflict' ", Political
Science Quarterly, LXVI (June, 1951), 248-71.
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But free land to the landless was scarcely the great gift that apologists for
the homestead measure maintained. A major limitation upon its effectiveness
was that at the very time it was adopted Congress was engaged in giving well
over 100,000,000 acres of the public lands to projected or prospective railroads
to aid in their construction. Also Congress continued the practice of granting
to the states on their admission into the Union from six to sixteen per cent of
their total area to aid in establishing and endowing common schools, universi
ties, asylums, hospitals and penitentiaries. Both railroads and states were ex
pected to sell their land at the highest price it would bring and at the minimum
of $3 to $10 an acre. Such prices brought it about that much of the land was
withheld from market and development for years and was ultimately sold on
long term credit which was close to rent. The states thus found themselves
dealing with the unpleasant task of collecting from numerous debtors or renting
their land. The railroads when they ran into difficulty with their numerous
land purchasers over collections were only too glad to shift the debt to local
banks which were not quite so vulnerable politically.
Both railroads and states assured, by virtue of the withdrawal of the lands
from market for a time until they were in demand at the price they sought,
that neighboring settlers through the work they did in farm making, road
construction, payment of taxes for the establishment of schools and other gov
ernment services created a good share of the value these lands acquired. In
continuing the donation plan until the admission of Arizona and New Mexico
in 1911 Congress not only withdrew 170,000,000 acres from access to home
steaders but assured the continuation of the revenue policy over this large area
and contributed to the development of tenancy. Liberal eastern thought and
western agrananism had won a victory over the reactionary forces that wished
to retain all the public lands as a major source of revenue, but it was only a
partial victory and the campaign for reform in the American pattern continued.!"
During and immediately after the Civil War the Radical Reconstructionists
w o were neither radical nor in the proper sense reconstructionists, but on the
contrary concerned to further the growth of big business, for a time joined with
land reformers in supporting a truly radical program of land reform. The
reason for this queer partnership was the hatred entertained by the Wade,
Chandler, Morrill, Trumbull group of "Radicals" for the southern planters
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Homestead Act of 1866 restricting the transfer of public lands to private own
ership. Under this measure public land in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Lou
isiana and Mississippi could be acquired by homesteaders only and until 1868
in units no larger than 80 acres. True, there was no restriction on alienability
but with that exception the radical views of Evans seem to have prevailed for
the southern states.
Little benefit came to tenants or land seekers in the south from the confis
cation acts or the Southern Homestead Act. The former were not vigorously
enforced, little land was recovered and no supplementary legislation was enacted
which would have assured its redistribution on a democratic basis. The
47,726,851 acres in the five southern states which were withdrawn from specu
lative purchasing seem to have been heavily timbered land that would require
much capital to improve and for whose principal resources there was but slight
demand in the ten years in which the Southern Homestead Act was in opera
tion. The repeal of the act in 1876 ended this venture.15
By 1870 the west was repenting of the liberality of the land grants it had
advocated and of the ease with which large individuals and corporate purchases
could be made from the government. All over the newly developing frontier
communities were signs that the land system was not working well from the
point of view of the poor immigrant searching for land. Large railroad, state
and private holdings were kept out of cultivation and use for years because of
the insistence on holding them for high prices. Settlers buying from these
holders almost invariably had difficulty in meeting their payments and at the
same time buying farm machinery, livestock, constructing their homes, fencing
the land and making other necessary improvements. Mortgage indebtedness
was extensive, the interest rates were high, and foreclosures common, espe
cially in periods of poor crops or low prices. Tenancy was appearing everywhere
in the corn belt and wheat belt, half the farms in some counties being owned
by absentees drawing their rents. Although the statistics of tenancy were not
to be collected by the Census Bureau until 1880 no observer could be ignorant
of its extent.
It was at this time that Henry George let loose his first blast against the
government land system and the means it provided for the accumulation of
large estates in the hands of the wealthy. His Our Land and Land Policy was
no dull esoteric discussion of rent, capital and labor but was a flaming indict
ment and by all odds the best contemporary survey of the effect of the Federal
land system in the distribution of ownership. Railroad land grants were de
nounced as "reckless prodigality," "land grabbers were called the curse of the
country, the story of the Mexican land claims in California were described as
"a history of greed, of perjury, of corruption, of spoilation and high-handed
15 Paul W. Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South, 1866-1888," Journal of Southern
History, VI (August, 1941), 303-30.
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robbery, for which it will be difficult to find a parallel." The land system was
declared to enable "speculators to rob settlers." "Was there ever national
blunder so great—ever national crime so tremendous as our in dealing with our
land?" George asked.16 His indictment was exaggerated, small ownerships were
being established, all farmers in the newer areas were not suffering in the
clutches of the money monster. George's critique contained much truth; more
important, it challenged attention, and contributed mightily to the demand for
reform.
For the remainder of the century the land reformers, in harmony with the
growing anti-monopoly movement in the west, tried to prevent Congress from
making additional grants of land to railroads, to secure the forfeiture of un
earned land grants to require the railroads to sell their lands at current market
values, rather than to continue withholding them for high prices, to prohibit
the accumulation of public land by aliens and to require the breakup of large
estates held by them, to end the cash sale law of 1820 which permitted unre
stricted purchasing of "offered" land, and to introduce into the General Land
Office and the courts a more "settler minded" attitude and to eliminate there
from the influence of railroad and mining companies and cattle and timber
barons.
The reformers, still a combination of eastern laborers and western agrarians,
put a halt to further land grants in 1871. Between 1867 and 1894 their pres
sure led to the forfeiture of 34,530,183 acres previously given railroads but
which were unearned. They forced the land grant railroads to speed up their
advertising and sales policy to hasten the transfer of their holdings into private
hands where they would be taxable. In 1916 they were responsible for the
recovery of nearly 3,000,000 acres long since given the Oregon and California
Railroad but not sold, as the grant provided, for $2.50 an acre. Pressure by
the reformers also galvanized the General Land Office into action which should
have been taken much earlier to restore to entry lands withdrawn to permit the
railroads to make their selections. At least 31,000,000 acres were thus restored
to entry.1" State after state and the Federal Government placed restrictions on
the right of aliens to acquire and hold lands. Finally, in 1891, the cash sale
law was repealed, thereby ending the right of unlimited purchase of "offered"
lands. To make the General Land Office more "settler minded" was less easy
to achieve. In the Cleveland administration there was a definite change of
US
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attitude but it was soon offset by later appointments. Outwardly, at least, the
officers deemed it essential to express concern about settler interests and to ask
Congress for reform in the laws.
These were notable victories which on the surface looked truly important.
They came only after long agitation and continued hard work on the part of
men such as George W. Julian, William S. Holman, Henry George, and
Terrence V. Powderly. The Grangers, the Greenback Party, the Anti-Monop
oly Party, the Populists, labor organizations and even the old line Republican
and Democratic Parties all had a share in these reforms. But the reforms came
late when much of the first rate land had passed into the hands of speculators
and railroads, when the best of the redwood lands of California, the Douglas
Fir land of Washington, and the long leaf pine land of the south were in the
hands of the lumber barons, when the copper, iron, and oil bearing land were
held by capitalistic combinations. Private ownership the west had favored and
steps which hastened the transfer from government hands were continually
being pushed by it.
Essentially the reform or liberal position on the land question thus far had
been to make the public land system function in a democratic way by assuring
the small man the right to acquire a piece of the national domain. Limitations
were put in the Preemption, the Graduation, the Homestead Acts and their
variations to make certain that only the small man could take advantage of them
until the issue of the patent, but beyond that they had no effect. All such
measures were therefore used by large interests acting through dummy entry
men" to acquire lands they could not legally acquire otherwise. Timber land
in Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Washington, grazing lands in Colo
rado, Wyoming, Arizona, and Idaho, wheat lands in Kansas, Nebraska, North
and South Dakota passed into the hands of great lumber companies, cattle com
panies, and bonanza farm groups under laws that were designed to prevent
large scale accumulation. The unwillingness of Congress to experiment with
restrictions on alienation made inevitable the concentration of ownership which
grieved western agrarians.
Evans, Greeley, George, and other radicals had failed to carry the mass
of land reformers with them on the question of alienability. Americans found
it easy to be radical or to favor reform when to do so did not impose any self
limitation, but few were attracted to any idea that might restrict their right to
accumulate property or to sell and gain the unearned increment.
With the larger and more valuable part of the public lands in private
hands the reforms which were being adopted at this late time were both ineffec
tive and to some extent unwise. Since the desirable size for land use units was
increasing as population moved into the arid and semi-arid regions the 320 acre
limitation on the amount of government land persons could acquire compelled
either evasion and abuse of the laws to acquire adequately sized units or the
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establishment of small grain farms in areas unsuited to cultivation. This pat
tern of evasion and abuse of the land laws and the establishment of small grain
farms in areas better planned by nature for grazing carried well into the twen
tieth century. Not until 1934 were comprehensive and far reaching reforms
initiated to produce a desirable and constructive plan of land use.
The preponderant, almost the universal view of Americans until near the
end of the nineteenth century was that the government should get out of the
land business as rapidly as possible by selling or giving to settlers, donating for
worthy purposes and ceding the lands to the states which should in turn pass
them swiftly into private hands. No matter how badly owners abused their
holdings through reckless cultivation, destructive and wasteful cutting of the
timber, prodigal and careless mining for coal and drilling for oil, few ques
tioned their right to subject their property to any form of use or abuse. An
extensive part of the fertile coastal plain and piedmont of the south and of the
hill farming area of the northeast could be cultivated in such a way as to re
duce the land to barren, gullied, and eroded tracts no longer able to produce
crops, to support families and to carry their share of community costs but few
denied the right of the owners to do as they wished with their property or,
more fundamentally, questioned the system of land distribution that seemed to
invite such practices. The shore line of the Atlantic, of bays and inlets, of
inland lakes all near congested urban areas could be monopolized by a wealthy
few and still there were few complaints. Rich landlords, speculators and cor
porations could buy unlimited amounts of land from the United States, or
purchase from other owners who had acquired tracts from the state or federal
government and keep their holdings from development for years, thereby blight
ing whole areas, delaying the introduction of schools and roads and doing
immeasurable harm to neighboring residents. The right of private property
seemed virtually unlimited, so far had American individualism gone.18 Our
Landed Heritage, to borrow Robbins' title, was expendable.19
Long before the Civil War agricultural authorities were expressing alarm
at the destructive farm practices employed in the tobacco and cotton fields of
the south and the wheat land of the north but their remedy was education
through farmers periodicals, societies, fairs, and the press. Undoubtedly edu
cation was helpful 20 but on the frontier where land was cheap and labor scarce,
where capital to meet the costs of farm making had usually to be borrowed at
high rates, where the most profitable cash crop had to be produced year in and
year out there was no alternative. Soil mining continued from frontier to
frontier but, unfortunately, it carried over into later periods when pioneer conan^restrictions^6 ^r°m
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editions had passed. Landlordism and tenancy, absentee ownership, and the
financial and economic ills into which agriculture fell in the late nineteenth
century all contributed to the cropping of tobacco, cotton, corn, and wheat too
steadily in areas to which they were adapted. Diminishing yields, the ravages
of insects which the continued cultivation of one crop encouraged, and eco
nomic necessity forced changes and some improvements but in many areas the
process of exhausting the soil continued. Not from agriculture, despite its ills,
was to come the cry for a fundamental change in land use and ownership.21
The serious economic losses to the nation resulting from the abuse of the
soil were subtle, slow and cumulative in their effects. The ravaging of our
natural resources by the lumber industry was obvious to all. Large scale com
mercial lumbering at this time consisted of the cutting and removing of choice
white pine in the easiest and cheapest ways possible without regard to protect
ing remaining trees like Norway, hemlock, spruce, and the hardwoods. Much
good timber was destroyed in the cutting and much when cut was left in the
woods to rot. The tops and branches when dry easily caught fire which, with
right conditions, could easily destroy the standing timber. When lumbermen
were finished with an area its natural beauty had been destroyed and the slash
remained to menace surrounding timber and settlements. Persons seeking
recreation in forested areas like the Adirondacks of New York, the Alleghanies
of Pennsylvania, the White Mountains of New Hampshire watched with in
creasing dismay the encroachments of the lumbermen on the areas they loved.
Early depletion of commercial timber in the more accessible areas forced lum
bermen to move into the higher parts of the mountains, the upper reaches of
the streams, into the areas where logs could not be floated cheaply to mill by
water but had to be hauled on sleds or brought to the mill by expensive logging
railroads. The increasing cost of lumber brought home to many people, espe
cially in the older centers where the supply was being exhausted, the desirability
of a more conservative and intelligent use of natural resources and the need
for the adoption of reforestation policies. Lumbermen with their eye on the
balance sheet were not sufficiently concerned to do anything at the time but an
aroused public, working through forestry and science associations, called for a
reorganization of our timberland disposal policy as a first step toward conser
vation and providing for future needs.22
None of the major works on agrarian discontent in the late nineteenth century include
any critical analysis of government land policies and the part they played in aggravat
ing the farmers' problems. For the fierce resentment at large estates that led to the
adoption of anti-alien landowning measures by the United States and a number of
middle western states see Paul W. Gates, Frontier Landlords and Pioneer Tenants,
49-61.
22 John Ise, The United States Forest Policy (New Haven, 1920), passim, is excellent
for the beginning of the conservation movement. Richard G. Lillard, The Great Forest
(New York, 1947), is useful for its account of the monopolistic practices of the lum
bermen and the way they brought ruin to areas of superlative natural beauty. Cf.
Agnes M. Larson, History of the White Pine Industry in Minnesota (Minneapolis,
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Support for a new plan of land administration came not only from the
lovers of wildlife, recreation interests, professional forestry people, and university professors but also from business men. Builders, contractors, real estate
agents, even lumbermen and dealers in stumpage were concerned. We know,
for example, that one of the largest dealers in timber lands and stumpage in
Wisconsin was an ardent supporter of the conservation movement.23 Those
diverse interests center their attention upon two principal proposals: (1) that
the government retain control of its timber land and sell only under careful
restrictions the stumpage, that is the right to cut, and not the land; (2) that
the government should not only carefully supervise cutting on the forest reserves
but should provide for the regeneration of cutover areas and the protection of
the forests from fire and disease.
The movement for the permanent withdrawal of timber lands from market
and their establishment in organized forest reserves was taken up principally
by congressmen from the older states in which the lumber industry was waning
or where the higher costs of timber were affecting building development. The
most active political support came from John Sherman of Ohio, George F.
Edmunds of Vermont, and from other congressmen principally from Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, and New York. For continued and permanent public owner
ships of the reserves and public controls, possibly even government lumbering,
there was no great support in the Senate, perhaps not in the House. Yet an
amendment providing for reservations when attached to an omnibus bill to
restrict land entries and repeal the preemption and timber culture acts, was
approved by Congress in 1891 without a division in either house. By a series
of fortuitous circumstances, including adroit leadership, forest reserves were
authorized almost a generation before Congress was "fully converted to the
principle" underlying them.24
The new forest policies involved a sharp break with the philosophy on
which American land policy had thus far rested, that is that the government
should not be in the business of purveying land any longer than necessary, that
it should provide for the easy and early transfer of the public lands to private
ownership, that it should not attempt to make gain from their disposal, that it
should not retain from private ownership any part thereof, or attempt to reserve
to itself royalty rights, rents, or other benefits.
Although that staunch old advocate of land reform, William S. Holman
of Indiana, firmly supported the change, the real impetus for it had not come
from the land reformers of the past, nor from farm organizations or trade
tnam wIl0?e. estimates of the remaining commercial
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unions. Neither was this stride toward collectivism the work of single taxers,
socialists, or other doctrinaire radicals. True, German intellectuals who were
familiar with state forestry in Europe had contributed to the movement but the
pressure for the change came out of American experience.25
The National Forest Reservation Act of 1891 did not require the establish
ment of reserves but gave authority to the President to withdraw from the
public domain such timbered land as he deemed advisable for permanent gov
ernment ownership and use. Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and McKinley with
drew some 50,000,000 acres but their action touched off opposition in Congress
to further withdrawals and little more was accomplished until Theodore Roose
velt became president. Despite his aristocratic background, Harvard education
and political associations with influential conservatives, Roosevelt, under the
tutelage and influence of Gifford Pinchot, espoused and pushed vigorously a
program of public land reservation and utilization that makes his administra
tion stand out with that of Franklin D. Roosevelt s as the greatest and most
forward looking in matters of planning and conservation. Approximate y
100,000,000 acres of public lands were placed under national forest status in
Theodore Roosevelt's administration.
Equally important was the establishment of a vigorous National Forest
Service that assured adequate protection to the reserves from plundering, traine
forces to fight fires and resist the encroachments of insects and disease, con
trolled cutting, enforced restrictions on grazing in the national forests an
conducted scientific experimentation in forest management and reforestation
As a result of wise leadership, successful public relations work and generous
appropriations despite frequent expressions of Congressional disapprova , t e
National Forest Service quickly became an agency with an ardent o owing
among professional foresters, farmers, and all those persons intereste in
ar£
preservation of wild life and long range plans for the development an
scale expansion of public forestry. No other agency in the growing e era
bureaucracy was so advanced in its planning, as collectivist in its thoug t, as
free from doctrinaire conservatism and at the same time free from utopia
radicalism as was the National Forest Service under Pinchot, Graves, an
successors.26
The next major step in forest conservation and the extension of public
control was taken in the Taft administration. New Englanders, alarmed by the
flood menace and fearful that their mountain areas would be strippe o t
splendid timber cover and defaced and forever marred by the advancing um
25

Bernhard E. Fernow, Brief History of Forestry in Europe, The United States and
Countries (Toronto, 1907), pp. 406 ff.
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bermen pleaded successfully that Congress authorize the purchase and establish
ment of national forests on the headwaters of the Connecticut and other impor
tant rivers of the east. The Weeks Forest Purchase Act has made possible the
great forests now being developed by the Federal government along the Appaachian ridge from Maine to Georgia, in the Northern Lake states, and in the
older states of the lower Mississippi. Individualism and laissez fake were thus
given o y ows in the citadel of capitalism. The American capacity to adapt
its social philosophy to practical necessity has never been better illustrated.^^
Long after 1891 the public land states continued hostile to forest conser
vation maintaining that other sections had exploited their resources as they
wished and that the timber of the west should not be locked up for future
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individualism of the past could no longer serve in the twentieth century world.
The government in business did not frighten people who foresaw that its result
would be growth and economic progress for many areas.
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provided that 95% of the income from the
public lands in the thirteen states and three territories containing semi-arid
lands was to go into a revolving fund for the construction of dams and reser
voirs to impound water for the irrigation of the parched land. Income from
water rents was also to feed the fund. Since the remaining five per cent of
public land receipts was already allotted for education the act of 1902 marked
the final abandonment of the notion that the lands should provide any revenue
for or even reimburse the Federal government for its large expense in manag
ing them.
Large scale government subsidies to agriculture thus began in a Republican
Roosevelt administration. Some would say that no greater handout to special
interests has been given.28 Since 1902 and through 1949 more than $1,805,000,000 have been appropriated for reclamation projects. The size of the
appropriation for 1949—$266,000,000—and the numerous projects that are
being pressed upon Congress calling for vastly greater sums indicate that we
are closer to the beginning than the end. Not only are giant dams and storage
basins, hundreds of miles of canals, vast pumping projects, and huge power
developments being undertaken but the course of major rivers is being reversed,
all for the major purpose of providing water for irrigation.
Many of the reclamation projects have not been economically successful
and few could have been financed in any sound way without grafting on them
hydroelectric power development.29 The sale of electric power has provided
much of the income and the cost of the various projects. Increasingly, as less and
less economically feasible irrigation projects were proposed, power was included
to finance and justify them. Long before the inauguration of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and even prior to the building of Muscle Shoals Dam on the Ten
nessee which marked the beginning of the Tennessee Valley development, the
Federal power industry, a thoroughly socialistic scheme, was under way, not at
the urging of the few theoretical socialists but through the strong administrative
leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, supported by numerous
28 Triple

A farm relief of 1933 was an emergency measure designed to bring the farmers
out of the worst depression we have suffered, though the subsidy program therein
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Needless to say the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Interior and of the Recla
mation Service, now the Bureau of Reclamation, are most detailed and useful but are
slanted, apologetic, uncritical and tinged with propagandists fervor.

' ^i? k6S' cr'?'ca' analysis of government reclamation activity, now somewhat dated but
still useful is R. P. Teele, The Economics of hand Reclamation in the United States
1Chicago, 1927).
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western Republicans and Democrats. Furthermore, Roosevelt, who has recently
been characterized as a conservative progressive, and Pinchot were responsible
for the withdrawal of water power sites to assure public control, ownership,
utilization and a fair rate structure when development was undertaken. Today,
the United States government is the greatest power producing agent in the
world. Such tremendous structures with their enormous power output as
Boulder, Shasta, Grand Coulee, Shoshone, Friant, Arrowrock, and Roosevelt, to
name only a few are the result of the demand of the west for Federal aid in
developing the arid lands.
American individualism, the belief that private interests could best and
most usefully exploit the mineral resources of the public domain had been
responsible for the transfer of the Calumet and Hecla copper of Michigan, the
Anaconda World s Richest Mill ' lode in Montana, the Mesabi iron field in
Minnesota and other valuable deposits to private ownership.33 Private enter
prises rapidly developed these and other natural resources and excited national
pride in the growing industrial strength of the United States. Before long,
however, the fear was aroused that "monopoly" was being established in the
mining industry as in manufacturing, transportation, banking, and in land
ownership and that too much economic power and too much wealth was in too
few hands. Again, however, it was from the conservationist that the impetus
came for government reservation of mineral land and the practice of leasing.
Exhaustion of natural resources was a widely discussed topic around the
turn of the century when predictions were being made that our coal, our oil,
other minerals, and forests would soon be depleted as to force dependence on
high cost mines, expensive timber and importation from abroad.-" Fearing that
the still unplumbed resources on the remaining public lands would soon be
acquired by private interests who would be concerned to transform them into
wealth at the earliest possible moment, Roosevelt, under the continued guidance
of Pxnchot, withdrew from entry and private acquisition the sub-soil rights on
all remaining public lands suspected of having value for their minerals. These
withdrawals gave Congress time over the years to formulate legislation for
leasing these lands to mining and oil companies under such conditions as were
deemed essential to assure supplies to meet current needs and those of the future
and especially to meet the needs of the Navy. Royalties from the mineral develop
ment were assigned to the reclamation fund.32 Not again could a United States
Steel Corporation, a Utah Copper Company or a Standard Oil Company secure
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ownership of rich deposits which they might exploit and solely profit from
without regard to other social interests, future needs or public welfare.
Conservation, the term popularly used for the changes being introduced
into land policy, meant in practice the careful use and management of the
natural resources of the public domain. By purely pragmatic reasoning the
leaders of the movement had reached the conclusion that the government should
not only retain or "reserve" title to ungranted lands but should manage and
control their use and exploitation to assure their wise and cautious use with
the profits derived therefrom assigned to other worthy objects for expansion.
This did not necessarily mean putting the government in business. Where these
objectives could be attained under private development government controls
would only be used to assure that end. Lumbering has been done within the
National Forests only by private enterprise; public power has been sold to
private distributing and manufacturing companies; drilling for oil and mining
phosphate, coal and other minerals on public lands has been done by private
interests. But no longer may the timber within the National Forests be wastefully cut or drilling for oil be continued in an overstocked market; no longer
may a small part of the coal be extracted once a mine is opened or the power
generated at a government plant be sold at excessively high prices to consumers.
After the great withdrawals for National Forests there remained large
areas of public domain good for forage. These grass or range lands varied
widely in vegetation, capacity to support cattle and sheep, and in economic
value to interested groups. Being unfenced and completely unregulated they
were pastured early and with harmful effect in the spring by livestock men
anxious to save their own forage. The edible grasses were browsed too closely,
were pastured too long, and were trampled badly by too many sheep and
cattle. As a result, the more nutritious plants were killed out in a greater or
less degree and noxious weeds came in; removal of the binding effect of the
plant cover permitted erosion to strip off the soil and cover with silt agricul
tural lands in the valleys or fill up the reservoirs and ditches. Unregulated and
uncontrolled use of the public range lands also produced strife between live
stock interests.
In contrast, range land within the National Forests was fenced, the num
ber of animals permitted on it was carefully correlated with the carrying capacity, overgrazing was not permitted, noxious weeds were eliminated, erosion
was minimized, seeding and replanting was done and experiments were conucted in the introduction of new and hardy types of grasses. In this way the
National Forest ranges continued to provide well for their users, strife was
avoided, and the management and development costs were paid by users on a
permittee basis.
The extension of range control within the National Forests was not accomp ished without friction and sharp opposition from livestock interests. How-
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ever, with a decentralized control and local participation in the framing of
policies and regulations this opposition gradually dissolved. It was another
matter, however, to secure agreement among the livestock people concerning
the best way of bringing order and improved conditions to the public domain
range.
A third of a century was spent in discussion, and argument as to the need
or and best way of obtaining controlled use of grazing on the remaining public
lands. Proposals were advanced to turn the land over to the states for their
a ministration, to permit private groups of livestock men to organize grazing
districts on the public lands and to maintain controls over their use, to add the
pu ic lands to existing National Forests for administrative and regulatory
purposes, to sell or transfer the lands in large grazing homesteads to livestock
interests and to establish a new government bureau whose task it should be
to introduce controlled use of the range.
Bureaucratic bickerings as well as the opposition of western livestock inter
ests delayed the final solution. The United States Department of Agriculture
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perhaps of securing additional handouts from the Treasury. Numerous political
problems affecting the public lands remain unsolved.83
We have thus seen how beginning with 1891 and continuing until today
the old policy of permitting, in fact encouraging the rapid transfer of the
public lands with their resources into private ownership was breached and
finally abandoned. No longer did private ownership seem the highest goal.
Instead, there was substituted for it public ownership, public controls designed
to ensure intelligent use of the resources, distribute their benefits more widely
and safeguard the interests of future generations. In the administration of its
public lands America has moved far from the revenue concept, through the
free grant and monopoly stage, which only partly met the objectives of the
reformers, through the third period in which permanent and public ownership
and controls were established. We are now beginning to reap the benefits. We
all may enjoy the beauties and scenic wonders of the National parks and forests,
thrill at the gigantic dams at Boulder and Grand Coulee, marvel at the way
reclamation and water projects have made great desert areas produce rich crops
and thriving cities. The liberal and reform position of the nineteenth century
might have avoided some of the worst blunders of the past but because restric
tion was unacceptable to all but a few it had to be replaced by a philosophy of
use that was more socially minded.
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